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Abstract
The atomic swap protocol allows for the exchange of cryptocurrencies
on different blockchains without the need to trust a third-party. However,
market participants who desire to hold derivative assets such as options
or futures would also benefit from trustless exchange. In this paper I
propose the atomic swaption, which extends the atomic swap to allow for
such exchanges. Crucially, atomic swaptions do not require the use of
oracles. I also introduce the margin contract, which provides the ability
to create leveraged and short positions. Lastly, I discuss how atomic
swaptions may be routed on the Lightning Network.
1 Trustless Exchange
Cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin rely on cryptographic protocols for security.
However, as originally designed, there was no mechanism for different blockchains
to communicate securely with each other. Thus, trading cryptocurrencies was
(and is) done ”off-chain”, or outside of the scope of the blockchains involved.
Two users who wished to trade would have to deposit their funds in a trusted
third party, typically taking the form of a centralized cryptocurrency exchange.
The need to trust centralized exchanges has long been an uncomfortable
reality within the cryptocurrency community. Exchange participants often fear
that their funds may be frozen, seized or stolen, and history has shown that such
fears are well-founded[1]. Conversely, exchanges with good reputations have
monopolistic power over potential new users/investors of a given cryptocurrency,
allowing them to extract rents and exercise undue influence over cryptocurrency
development in general. For instance, they can choose which new altcoins to
support on their exchange, perhaps charging a listing fee. Creators of new
altcoins must cede to their demands or take their chances by working with less
reputable exchanges. These frictions make it difficult for new participants to
first acquire coins, posing an impediment to the adoption of cryptocurrencies.
The volatility of cryptocurrencies provides another impediment to their
adoption, gamblers and speculators notwithstanding. Potential users might be
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more inclined to adopt a given cryptocurrency if they were able to hedge its
volatility risk through the use of financial options or futures markets. For ex-
ample, producers of cryptocurrencies (i.e. miners) have revenues denominated
in cryptocurrency, but generally have expenses denominated in various fiat cur-
rencies. However, relying on centralized exchanges for derivatives trades would
expose users to the same problems that spot traders face. In fact, these prob-
lems would be magnified. The long-term nature of derivatives means that users
would have to keep their assets on the exchange for the entire length of the
contract. In addition, any leverage offered by the exchange would lead to direct
and indirect counterparty risk; the exchange may enter into one-sided bets or
be lax in enforcing margin for some of its users. In the case of extreme market
fluctuations, the exchange may become insolvent.
The atomic swap allows users to avoid the risks and disadvantages inherent
to centralized exchanges when trading. Atomic swaps use Hashed Time Lock
Contracts (HTLCs), a form of cryptographic escrow; the blockchains themselves
act as the trusted third party. Viewed another way, atomic swaps utilize cryp-
tographic secrets to allow users to prove on one blockchain that certain events
occurred on a different blockchain.
In this paper I demonstrate that the functionality of atomic swaps can be
further extended to allow the creation of option contracts, which I term atomic
swaptions. In particular, parties can deposit only a fractional margin instead of
the full principal. This, in turn, allows for a meaningful notion of a futures con-
tract, enabling users to take leveraged or short positions on one cryptocurrency
against another.
1.1 Related Work
Previous approaches to decentralized derivatives have focused on trading ERC20
tokens on the Ethereum blockchain [2] [3] and/or use oracles (trusted providers
of external data) to determine contract outcomes [4]. In contrast, the approach
I outline can be used between different blockchains, with only the requirement
that they can support the creation of HTLCs with the same hash function.
Namely, the blockchains don’t need to be Turing-complete like Ethereum. In
addition, atomic swaptions don’t require oracles, eliminating an unnecessary
element of trust from the process.
2 Layout
In this paper, I review how atomic swaps work, then show how atomic swaptions
naturally arise as an extension of them. I show how various features can be
implemented, such as early cancellation and margin. Furthermore, I discuss
how atomic swaptions could be used in practice. In particular, I discuss how
they may be implemented on the Lightning Network, as well as the general
ramifications of having long-term contracts on the Lightning Network. Finally,
I note some of the risks and limitations of atomic swaptions.
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In the example transactions I use, Alice initially possesses ACoin and Bob
initially possesses BCoin, placeholder cryptocurrencies that live on different
blockchains with functionality equivalent to Bitcoin. Alice plays the role of
swaption buyer, while Bob plays the role of swaption seller.
Contract diagrams are in the appendix; readers are encouraged to refer to
the appendix to aid their understanding of the overall structure.
3 Atomic Swap
Suppose Alice wants to trade her ACoin for Bob’s BCoin. If she were to send
her Acoin to Bob first, Bob could then simply drop out of the process without
sending any BCoin to her, and vice versa if Bob sends his BCoin first. Instead,
Alice and Bob can use an atomic swap, which doesn’t require either party to
trust the other to act honestly. First, they construct a Hashed Time Lock
Contract (HTLC) for Alice’s ACoin. Omitting the implementation details, the
HTLC allows Bob to take the ACoin if he can provide the secret value A, which
only Alice knows. It also allows Alice to take back the ACoin after expiration
time T +1, in case Bob drops out. Once the ACoin has been sent to the HTLC,
Bob deposits his BCoin into a similar HTLC set to expire at time T , so that it
expires before Alice’s does. This allows him to reclaim the BCoin if Alice fails
to reveal A. If she publishes the transaction to take the BCoin, then in doing
so she reveals A; Bob can then use A to take the ACoin, completing the swap.
4 Atomic Swaption
Notice that Alice is able to purposefully renege on the trade after Bob deposits
his BCoin. She may do this if the price of ACoin has gone up relative to BCoin
after she and Bob have agreed to trade. In fact, she has until the expiration
of the contract to decide whether or not to go through with the trade. Bob is
locked into the trade; he receives the coins that Alice considers less valuable.
In other words, the atomic swap can be seen as a financial option allowing
Alice the ability to trade ACoin for BCoin at a fixed price, which has value for
Alice. For small values of T , this ”option value” will generally be small, as it is
unlikely that market prices will change greatly in a short period of time.
If T were large, then Alice would gain significant option value. In return,
Alice could pay Bob a premium to enter into this so-called swaption contract
(an option to do a swap). The question arises as to how the swaption can be
exchanged securely for the premium. This is done by nesting the swaption into
another atomic swap. In this example, Alice pays the premium in ACoin, but
she could also pay using an arbitrary cryptocurrency, since atomic swaps can
involve an arbitrary number of blockchains.
This framework allows for some variations. For example, a compound op-
tion is simply an option on an option, so it can be implemented through further
nesting of HTLCs. Similarly, a collar option strategy can be implemented ef-
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ficiently through nesting rather than by trading multiple swaptions. It is even
possible to create an option to enter into a discreet log contract. Here, I analyze
early cancellation and margin, as they are likely to be very useful for swaption
traders.
4.1 Early Cancellation
Suppose Alice would like to be able to forfeit the swaption and reclaim her ACoin
early. It’s possible to design the refund transactions to allow Alice and Bob to
cancel the swaption, but Bob may be uncooperative and force Alice to wait
until expiration. Instead, the swaption can be configured so that Alice can use
another secret to cancel it. To ensure that Alice does not try to simultaneously
exercise and cancel the swaption, the funds are sent to Revocable Sequence
Maturity Contracts. The RSMC corresponding to Alice’s exercise transaction
allows Bob to take the BCoin if Alice also published the cancel transaction,
and vice versa. Thus, if Alice tries to cheat, Bob can take all of the funds as
punishment.
4.2 Margin
Instead of depositing all of their funds into the contract, Alice and Bob can
agree to deposit only a fraction (”margin”) of the total funds (”principal”).
This is achieved through the use of a margin contract. Bob’s margin contract
allows him to send the margin to the swaption contract, but the transaction that
allows him to do this specifies that the output is equal to the full principal, thus
requiring that he also deposit the rest of the funds as well. In Bitcoin, this is
best achieved through use of SIGHASH ANYONECANPAY. Blockchains with
different scripting rules may require Bob to send the principal remainder to a
placeholder contract first.
If Bob does not deposit funds into the swaption contract by the margin
expiration, Alice can take the margin funds, and does not need to reveal any
secret to do so, meaning that she can also take back her ACoin by not exercis-
ing. Alice’s margin contract functions similarly, but should expire before Bob’s
margin contract does. If she fails to deposit the principal, then Bob can take
her margin, and forfeit his own.
It should be noted that Alice’s margin deposit is only necessary due to
the limitations of HTLCs as a communication protocol between blockchains.
That is, Bob cannot prove on the BCoin blockchain that Alice didn’t deposit
funds into the ACoin swaption contract (and Alice cannot prove on the BCoin
blockchain that she did deposit the ACoin). If this were possible, then Alice’s
exercise transaction, which occurs on the BCoin blockchain, could be prevented
until she deposited her ACoin into the ACoin swaption contract. If, however,
ACoin and BCoin were on the same blockchain (e.g. they were both ERC20
tokens), then the contract could be designed so that Alice would not need to
deposit any funds until she decides to exercise.
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When negotiating terms, Alice and Bob should take into account the pos-
sibility of strategic default, which changes the payoff function of the swaption.
Setting Alice’s margin-to-principal ratio to be equal to Bob’s is sufficient to en-
sure that Alice never has an incentive to default; however, unless Bob’s margin
is equal to the principal, there are situations in which he is incentivized to de-
fault. In light of this, I outline two possible approaches to designing swaptions
on margin, with equal margin ratios between Alice and Bob. The fixed margin
approach is essentially ”set and forget”; once the swaption is set up, Alice and
Bob don’t need to take any action until the swaption is about to expire. The
floating margin approach tries to closely replicate the traditional payoff function
of a call or put option, but requires frequent interaction between Alice and Bob.
4.2.1 Fixed margin swaption
Here, the margin expiration M is set right before the swaption expiration
(E − 2 at the latest), so that Bob decides at expiration whether or not to
default. Let mB , pB correspond to the amount of BCoin margin and princi-
pal, and likewise for pA. The intrinsic value of the swaption is then given by
max(0,min(mB , pB−pA)), not including the value of the margin deposit. This
leads to the kinked payoff function shown in Figure 1; it can be decomposed
into two traditional options for the purposes of pricing.
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Figure 1: Fixed margin swaption payoff functions. Note that both graphs de-
scribe the same swaption. When denominated in ACoin it is a call option; when
denominated in BCoin, it is a put option.
4.2.2 Floating margin swaption
Here, Alice and Bob can agree to continuously ”mark to market” the option,
increasing or decreasing the amount of margin required such that the expected
gain from strategic default is below a small, pre-determined threshold. This is
done by atomically cancelling the old swaption while creating the new swaption.
The margin expiration is set to an intermediate value M , perhaps ranging from a
day to a week. If Alice and Bob cooperate, the time until the margin expiration
will continuously be reset to this value, but if one party stops cooperating (such
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as in a dispute about the marking), then the two parties have time to come up
with the funds to avoid defaulting. The choice of M is a tradeoff; a smaller value
of M allows for smaller margin and/or a lower probability of strategic default,
but provides less time to respond in the non-cooperative case.
Floating margin is best done on a ”layer 2” off-chain scaling solution such
as the Lightning Network, which allows users to make secure contracts without
having to publish any transactions, except in the case of cheating. Otherwise,
it could be very expensive to repeatedly create and cancel swaption contracts
using on-chain transactions.
4.2.3 Futures
Since floating margin faithfully replicates the payoff of a call/put option, it
can be used for the creation of futures contracts. A version of put-call parity
states that a long futures contract is equivalent to a long call option and short
put option position (disregarding early exercise). In other words, to create
a futures contract, Alice and Bob can atomically open two floating margin
swaptions simultaneously with the same strike price and expiration, allowing
Alice to swap 1 ACoin for 1 BCoin and allowing Bob to swap 1 BCoin for
1 ACoin. Note that this construction is non-trivial because Alice contributes
ACoin to both contracts. The strike price should be kept close to the futures
market price (more correctly, the expected spot price at expiration), in order to
minimize the amount of margin needed.
5 Lightning Network Routing
Note that much of this analysis can be applied to other long-term contracts such
as discreet log contracts, which are easier to handle since they only pertain to
one blockchain.
It is possible for Alice and Bob to enter into swaption contracts through
intermediate participants on the Lightning Network, in the same way that they
could perform an atomic swap by chaining Hashed Time Lock Contract (HTLC)
ACoin payments going from Alice to Bob and looping back with BCoin pay-
ments.
As each step of the swaption consists of a HTLC and/or a contract sending
to a HTLC, it is straightforward to implement atomic swaptions on LN, by
adding Revocable Sequence Maturity Contracts as needed. Deviating actions by
intermediaries are unprofitable and will not result in loss for other participants.
It should also be clear that several HTLCs can be open simultaneously on a
payment channel. Therefore, long-running swaptions don’t disrupt operation of
the channels, beyond the specific amount of funds that have to be tied up in
the swaption contract.
Within a payment channel, users only need enough funds to cover the margin
to participate in a swaption contract. However, they may have to close the
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payment channel in order to pay the principal if they don’t have enough funds
in the channel.
5.1 Third Party Decoupling and Unwinding
If a third party, Carol, has nodes appearing on both the ACoin and BCoin
paths between Alice and Bob, she can instead decouple the swaption, using her
own secret with Bob. In this case, Carol functions as counterparty to both
Alice and Bob (or to other intermediaries acting similarly), and has zero net
position. This lowers the required time for swaption exercise (since each step of
a chain of HTLC payments must expire 1 timestep later). Furthermore, Carol
can unilaterally close her long option position with Bob without waiting for
Alice to do so, freeing up her funds sooner. In the fully cooperative case, it also
simplifies the option unwinding process.
Suppose now that an identical trade passes through Alice and Carol such
that Carol would open a long position against Alice. Since Alice and Carol
would now have a net zero position against each other, it would be ideal to end
the process such that both swaptions have been cancelled, so that their funds
are not locked up needlessly. Carol can set her swaption with Alice to expire
1 timestep after Alice’s swaption with her, using the same secrets. Alice would
then reveal her secret, causing a circular flow of funds that can be undone with
cyclic rebalancing.
Similarly, by using self-trading, existing positions can be rerouted, such as
when two parties want to close their channel without putting any contracts onto
the blockchain. Use of these techniques can help minimize the costs of keeping
the chain of swaption positions open on the LN.
Dave Alice BobCarol
A
A
C
C
(a) Bob sells a swaption to Alice.
Dave Alice BobCarol
A
A
C
C
A
A
A’
A’
(b) Dave sells an identical swaption to Carol.
Dave Alice BobCarol
C
C
A’
A’
(c) Alice and Carol cancel their swaptions.
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5.2 Economic Considerations
Long paths are likely to be expensive, as Alice and Bob will have to compensate
all of the intermediaries for the time value of their locked-up funds, as well as
for taking on the risks and possible network transaction fees inherent in the
process. Note also that intermediaries will have to maintain sufficient liquidity
in order to avoid defaulting on margin swaptions, and need to be compensated
for this. Swaptions, DLCs, and other long-term contracts all compete for the
same network fund capacity.
This suggests that LN-based derivatives trading will mostly be fairly central-
ized, with a small set of densely connected large traders/exchanges, and many
smaller traders directly connected to the large traders.
The ability to unwind identical swaptions encourages standardization of con-
tract terms such as strike price, size, expiry, etc.
6 Practical Considerations
As with other long-term contracts, there is a risk that there is an emergency rule
change on one of the blockchains, such as in the hashing or signing algorithm.
Presumably, unmoved coins will be burned (rendered unspendable). There are a
few possibilities for Alice and Bob; the dynamics are influenced by the particular
contract and the timing of the rule change. They may cooperate and reopen the
contract under the new rules, possibly with one party extorting the other for an
excess payment. If Bob isn’t cooperative, Alice must choose between exercise or
cancelling by the move deadline, forfeiting the extrinsic value of the swaption.
However, Alice can also harm Bob by not acting until the compromised coins
are burned, then taking the coins from the other blockchain.
Leveraged trading is unlikely to be user-friendly, as it may require a good
deal of familiarity with options pricing formulas/software. In addition, users of
margin should not rely on their counterparty being cooperative, as the counter-
party often stands to gain substantially if margin is forfeited. It is even possible
that, given a substantial enough swaption market, manipulators will attempt
to orchestrate ”short squeezes” by accumulating large swaption positions whose
margin expirations occur at the same time. They may be aided through use of
long paths of intermediaries on LN.
Timelocks must be set to use time elapsed rather than block height, so that
the timelocks expire in the intended order; it is difficult to predict the relative
timing of future blocks between two different blockchains. Of course, it’s not
clear that many users would prefer to use block height if it were possible.
There have been a variety of attempts to create cryptocurrencies pegged
to fiat currencies. Users seeking to minimize volatility will likely prefer to use
pegged cryptocurrencies in their swaption trades, though this of course requires
them to trust in the underlying peg.
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7 Conclusion
The design and adoption of new blockchains is an ongoing process, and it re-
mains an open question what operations a blockchain should support to best
facilitate the development of applications on top of it. I have demonstrated
that a wide class of inter-blockchain derivatives can be implemented with only
the features required to implement an atomic swap. The atomic swaption thus
provides a practical path to derivatives trading on existing cryptocurrencies,
and removes the need for designers of future blockchains to create specialized
derivatives applications.
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Appendix: Contract Diagrams
This section contains example diagrams for the contracts described in sections
3 and 4. The diagrams are styled after the LN paper[5], with some differences.
Boxes correspond to transactions; the fill color indicates which blockchain the
transaction takes place on, while the border color indicates who can publish the
transaction. The vertical order of the boxes loosely correspond to the temporal
sequence of events. The numbers should of course not be taken literally; in
particular, 1 timestep should be interpreted as a quantity that allows parties to
comfortably respond to their counterparty’s actions in the appropriate manner.
Funding Tx
Alice broadcasts
Output: HTLC 1 ACoin
Funding Tx
Bob broadcasts
Output: HTLC 1 BCoin
Alice accepts:
reveals A
Alice reneges:
reveals nothing
Swap Tx
Only Alice can broadcast
Secret: A
Output: Alice 1 BCoin
Swap Tx
Only Bob can broadcast
Secret: A
Output: Bob 1 ACoin
Refund Tx
Only Bob can broadcast
T LockTime
Output: Bob 1 BCoin
Refund Tx
Only Alice can broadcast
T+1 LockTime
Output: Alice 1 ACoin
Figure 3: Atomic swap.
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Funding Tx
Alice broadcasts
Output: HTLC 1.1 ACoin
Funding Tx
Bob broadcasts
Output: HTLC 1 BCoin
Alice accepts:
reveals A
Alice reneges:
reveals nothing
Swaption Funding Tx
Only Alice can broadcast
Secret: A
Output: Swaption 1 BCoin
Swaption Funding Tx
Only Bob can broadcast
Secret: A
Outputs:
0. Bob 0.1 ACoin
1. Swaption 1 ACoin
Refund Tx
Only Bob can broadcast
T LockTime
Output: Bob 1 BCoin
Refund Tx
Only Alice can broadcast
T+1 LockTime
Output: Alice 1.1 ACoin
Alice exercises:
reveals A2
Alice lets expire:
reveals nothing
Exercise Tx
Only Alice can broadcast
Secret: A2
Output: Alice 1 BCoin
Exercise Tx
Only Bob can broadcast
Secret: A2
Output: Bob 1 ACoin
Expiration Tx
Only Bob can broadcast
E LockTime
Output: Bob 1 BCoin
Expiration Tx
Only Alice can broadcast
E+1 LockTime
Output: Alice 1 ACoin
Figure 4: Basic atomic swaption construction.
12
Alice exercises:
reveals A2
Alice lets expire:
reveals nothing
Expiration Tx
Only Bob can broadcast
E LockTime
Output: Bob 1 BCoin
Exercise Tx
Only Alice can broadcast
Secret: A2
Output: RSMC 1 BCoin
Exercise Tx
Only Bob can broadcast
Secret: A2
Output: Bob 1 ACoin
Alice cancels:
reveals A3
Cancel Tx
Only Alice can broadcast
Secret: A3
Output: RSMC 1 ACoin
Cancel Tx
Only Bob can broadcast
Secret: A3
Output: Bob 1 BCoin
Alice cheated:
revealed A2 and A3
Breach Remedy Tx
Only Bob can broadcast
Secret: A3
Output: Bob 1 BCoin
Breach Remedy Tx
Only Bob can broadcast
Secret: A2
Output: Bob 1 ACoin
Delivery Tx
Only Alice can broadcast
1 Relative LockTime
Output: Alice 1 BCoin
Delivery Tx
Only Alice can broadcast
1 Relative LockTime
Output: Alice 1 ACoin
Figure 5: Early Cancellation. Unchanged portions have been omitted. Note the
race conditions between Alice and Bobs’ exercise and cancel transactions in the
case where Alice broadcasts both transactions, which necessitates the RSMCs.
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Funding Tx
Alice broadcasts
Output: HTLC 0.3 ACoin
Funding Tx
Bob broadcasts
Output: HTLC 0.2 BCoin
Alice accepts:
reveals A
Alice reneges:
reveals nothing
Swaption Margin Tx
Only Alice can broadcast
Secret: A
Output: Margin 0.2 BCoin
Swaption Margin Tx
Only Bob can broadcast
Secret: A
Outputs:
0. Bob 0.1 ACoin
1. Margin 0.2 ACoin
Alice defaults:
does nothing
Default Tx
Only Bob can broadcast
M LockTime
Output: Bob 0.2 ACoin
Alice pays:
deposits principal
Swaption Funding Tx
Only Alice can broadcast
AnyoneCanPay
Output: Swaption 1 ACoin
Bob defaults:
does nothing
Default Tx
Only Alice can broadcast
M+1 LockTime
Output: Alice 0.2 BCoin
Bob pays:
deposits principal
Swaption Funding Tx
Only Bob can broadcast
AnyoneCanPay
Output: Swaption 1 BCoin
Alice exercises:
reveals A2
Alice lets expire:
reveals nothing
Figure 6: Swaption with margin.
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